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SUBSIDIARITY IN REGIONAL 
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ANDREAS VON STADEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The principle of subsidiarity features prominently in discussions concerning 
the allocation and exercise of political and legal authority in multilevel 
governance arrangements in which at least some competences are shared 
between different levels of politico–legal decisionmaking—so much so that 
some have heralded, at least in Europe, an emerging “age of subsidiarity.”1 
Understood as signifying a “rebuttable presumption for the local,”2 or favoring 
lower levels of political organization and decisionmaking more generally, much 
of the legal and political science literature on the topic takes its principal 
theoretical and empirical cues from the experience with subsidiarity and its 
cognates in European institutional contexts. In the European Union (EU), 
subsidiarity made its first appearance in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht3 and is 
currently codified in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU);4 an 
additional protocol provides national parliaments with monitoring rights as to 
the EU’s compliance with the principle.5 In the context of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),6 subsidiarity considerations have 
figured in particular as part of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, which 
grants respondent states some freedom of choice in how they interpret and 
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 1.  See, e.g., Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of 
Subsidiarity, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 491 (2014). 
 2.  Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-
Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 
147, 148. 
 3.  Treaty on European Union arts. B & G (5), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 6 (introducing 
new article 3(b) on the subsidiarity principle into the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community).  
 4.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 18 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
 5.  See Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 
2010 O.J (C 83) 206.  
 6.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. no. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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apply Convention provisions domestically.7 Developed especially in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), express 
references to the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity as guides for the 
Court’s supervisory practice will be added to the preamble of the ECHR once 
Protocol No. 15 to the Convention enters into force.8 
Whereas the meaning and operation of subsidiarity in the European context 
are fairly well investigated and understood, less is known about the principle’s 
significance outside of Europe. Nothing about subsidiarity would prevent it 
from being deployed in multilevel governance arrangements elsewhere, and 
some authors have discussed the subsidiarity principle in terms of its general 
applicability.9 Regarding specifically regional contexts, there is no dearth of 
organizations in the Americas, Africa, or Asia—nor of organizations that cut 
across regions and continents—that strive for greater economic and, less 
frequently, political integration of their member states. In these organizations, 
subsidiarity might have a role to play. Because the institutional designs of many 
regional integration organizations have been inspired by the European model, 
and because the question of the exercise of overlapping competences located at 
different levels of politico–legal organization can arise in all multilevel 
governance systems, one might expect that a fundamental principle that 
addresses precisely this question and that has fruitfully been employed 
elsewhere would be adopted as well. 
This article investigates the presence or absence of subsidiarity in select 
regional economic integration organizations—namely, the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur) and the Andean Community in Latin America, and also the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African 
 
 7.  See Herbert Petzold, The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 41, 59 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher 
& Herbert Petzold eds., 1993) (noting that the “margin of appreciation . . . stems directly from the 
principle of subsidiarity as it applies within the Convention system”); Alastair Mowbray, Subsidiarity 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 313, 320–39 (2015) (tracing the 
use of subsidiarity in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence); Dominic McGoldrick, A Defence of the Margin of 
Appreciation and an Argument for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 21, 22–32 (2016) (examining justifications and critique for the Court’s deference based on the use 
of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine). 
 8.  See Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, June 24, 2013, C.T.E.S. no. 213; see also Protocol No. 16 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pmbl. & art. 1, Oct. 2, 
2013, C.T.E.S. no. 214 (establishing the right of the highest national courts to request ECtHR advisory 
opinions in order to “reinforce implementation of the Convention, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity”); Føllesdal, supra note 2, at 153.  
 9.  See, e.g., DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014); Andreas 
Føllesdal, Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law, 2 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (2013); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003); Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005); see also Jorge Contesse, 
Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 2, 2016, at 123.  
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Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) in Africa. Part II briefly restates the theoretical framework for this 
investigation. Parts III and IV examine, at the level of formal legal instruments 
and other official documents, the use and definition of subsidiarity in the 
regional contexts under consideration. The final part concludes. 
II 
SUBSIDIARITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES 
As noted above, the basic thrust of the subsidiarity principle10 favors 
governance at lower, more local levels. The functional role of the principle in 
concrete governance arrangements beyond the state is to lay down the criteria 
that, if met, rebut that presumption and authorize or justify the exercise of 
authority at the regional or global level of organization. These criteria turn 
subsidiarity into a conditional switch between levels of governance. In the case 
of the EU, the implied criteria are effectiveness and efficiency: as stipulated by 
Article 5(3) of the TEU, for the EU to exercise a nonexclusive competence, the 
subsidiarity principle requires that the intended objective cannot be adequately 
accomplished by the member states acting alone and “can rather, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”11 
Both the negative and the positive criteria must be met before the subsidiarity 
principle points to the EU as the institution appropriate for regulation and 
policymaking.12 
In other institutionally bounded contexts,13 different criteria have been 
employed. The “complementarity principle,” operating at the admissibility 
stage of cases brought before the International Criminal Court, also employs 
the logic of subsidiarity by using a country’s inability or unwillingness to pursue 
prosecutions domestically as the criteria for rebutting the presumption for the 
local.14 Elsewhere, the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” requirement, a 
standard admissibility requirement litigants must meet before the merits of 
individual human rights complaints can be considered by judicial and quasi-
 
 10.  See Theodore Schilling, A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a 
Principle, 14 YB. EUR. L. 203, 213–17 (1994) (using Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between rule and 
principle to point out that subsidiarity as codified in the EU represents an instance of the former rather 
than the latter, but that subsidiarity may also operate in a principle’s guiding, rather than a rule’s 
outcome-determinative manner).  
 11.  TEU, supra note 4, art. 5(3). 
 12.  PHILIPP KIIVER, THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND EMPIRICAL REALITY 70 (2012). 
 13.  See Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 8–9 (distinguishing between the operation of subsidiarity in 
unbounded versus institutionally bounded contexts). 
 14.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (stipulating that cases are inadmissible before the ICC except where a state involved with 
jurisdiction over the charged crime(s) is “unwilling or unable” to investigate and prosecute itself); see 
also id. arts. 17(2) & 17(3) (laying down criteria for determining unwillingness and inability). 
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judicial dispute-settlement bodies beyond the state,15 expresses a sequential 
version of subsidiarity. In the same issue area, the ECtHR’s “margin of 
appreciation” foregrounds the epistemic advantages of national 
decisionmakers,16 the greater democratic legitimacy of domestic procedures,17 
and the absence of a European policy of near-consensus as compelling, but still 
rebuttable, reasons for deference.18 
In line with the demand and supply conjectures articulated in the 
introduction to this issue,19 in the case of the regional organizations here under 
consideration, one should expect the appearance of subsidiarity, or of a related 
competence-selecting principle, to be conditioned by the following factors: 
First, demand for subsidiarity should be higher the more the regional 
arrangement creates an actual multilevel governance system that situates 
consequential politico–legal decision-making power at the regional level and 
whose nonexclusive competence overlaps with that of the member states.20 
Second, subsidiarity should more likely be demanded the more regional 
decisionmaking is removed from state consent, that is, when consensus and 
unanimity give way to majority voting—“pooled sovereignty”21—or even to full 
delegation of decision-making authority to a regional organ no longer directly 
controlled by states.22 Third, the demand for subsidiarity should be positively 
correlated with the intrusiveness and specificity of an organization’s or organ’s 
output.23 Fourth, the more a regional integration regime deals preponderantly 
with the regulation and management of (economic) externalities, the smaller 
the probability that a subsidiarity principle will be supplied; by the same token, 
as more internal matters are being regulated, the probability of its supply 
should increase.24 Fifth, the preferences of powerful member states for 
regulatory uniformity, and, sixth, preferences of well-entrenched regional 
 
 15.  See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 6, art. 35(1) (“The Court may only deal with the matter after all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted . . . .”); American Convention on Human Rights art. 46(1), 
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
 16.  See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 148–50 (2012). 
 17.  See id. at 75–79; see also Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review 
Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1023, 
1041–42 (2012). 
 18.  KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 132–42 (2015) (discussing the role of consensus in the width of 
the margin of appreciation).  
 19.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 13, at 14–17. 
 20.  Id. at 14–15. 
 21.  See generally Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Delegation and Pooling in International 
Organizations, 10 REV. INT’L ORGS. 305, 307 (2015) (distinguishing delegation as a “conditional grant 
of authority by member states to an independent body” from pooling, defined as “joint decision making 
among the principals themselves”). 
 22.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 13, at 15. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
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bodies for securing or broadening their own authority should likewise be 
expected to lower the probability of the provision of a formally articulated 
subsidiarity principle.25 
Given these conjectures, the institutional contexts in which one should most 
likely find references to subsidiarity are the regional regimes’ third-party 
dispute-settlement arrangements. Regarding the question of overlapping 
competences as the most obvious general context for the application of a 
subsidiarity principle, assessments are complicated by the fact that few treaties 
follow the EU’s example of expressly allocating competences in terms of 
exclusiveness and nonexclusiveness.26 As a result, their exclusive or 
nonexclusive character will usually have to be inferred from the governance 
architecture as a whole and subsequent practice under the treaty in question. 
Furthermore, although the demand for subsidiarity may be highest under 
conditions of delegation and pooled sovereignty, it also retains some utility in 
arrangements that preserve a national veto by requiring consensus or 
unanimity. This is so because the exercise of that veto is generally in the hands 
of the executive branch, which represents the state in international 
organizations, and its exercise or nonexercise may not reflect the subsidiarity 
concerns of other national stakeholders with competences at stake, such as 
national parliaments. That said, executives generally have little incentive, unless 
compelled, to press for the inclusion of subsidiarity principles that benefit other, 
possibly rival, domestic institutions. 
Subsidiarity may play different roles in the institutional design and 
operation of regional organizations. When formally included in an 
organization’s constitutive instrument, as in the case of the EU, subsidiarity 
may be invoked to regulate, guide, or otherwise inform the choice of the level, 
or site, of politico–legal decision-making competence that is to be exercised to 
achieve a given objective. In this sense, then, subsidiarity primarily serves a 
selection function. The absence of any mention of subsidiarity in the 
organization’s legal or policy instruments, however, does not necessarily mean 
that considerations of subsidiarity have been absent. Instead, subsidiarity 
concerns may have already affected the decision as to which competences have 
been delegated to the regional organization in the first place, which reveals an 
allocation function. Though there may be contention over whether, in the 
absence of express stipulation, the competences allocated to the regional 
organization are exclusive or not, at least with respect to those decision-making 
powers that have been left entirely at the national level one may safely infer 
that the treaty drafters determined that the domestic level was the appropriate 
one for achieving any objectives within the relevant policy domain. Last but not 
least, irrespective of whether formally stipulated as an institutional principle or 
not, considerations of subsidiarity may still inform the manner and modalities of 
 
 25.  Id. at 16–17. 
 26.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 2–6, 
2012 O.J. (C326) 47, 50–53 [hereinafter TFEU].  
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the exercise of both exclusive and nonexclusive competences of international 
organizations. Whereas all three uses of the subsidiarity principle are important 
and may be separately or jointly present, this article focuses only on the extent 
to which subsidiarity is being articulated and employed as an express 
competence-selecting principle in the regional organizations reviewed here. 
III 
SUBSIDIARITY IN LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES 
In addition to the intricate web of regional trade agreements, aptly captured 
by the memorable metaphor of the “spaghetti bowl” of multiple and often 
overlapping agreements,27 the Americas are home to a sizable number of formal 
regional organizations that at least nominally pursue economic and political 
integration. Indeed, since the late 1960s, “integration” is mentioned as a 
programmatic goal in the continent-wide Charter of the Organization of 
American States (OAS).28 With the exception of the OAS and a few subregional 
organizations of which Mexico is a member, all of these are located in Latin 
America, which is home to at least thirteen regional and subregional 
organizations as of 2012.29 This part discusses two of the most prominent Latin 
American regional integration organizations: Mercosur and the Andean 
Community.30 
A. Mercosur 
Mercosur was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, concluded 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.31 In 2012, Venezuela joined 
 
 27.  See ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL ET AL., BRIDGING REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE 
AMERICAS viii–x (Inter-American Developmental Bank Special Report on Integration and Trade, 
2009) (discussing the increase in regional trade agreements and the consequences of the “spaghetti 
bowl’s” continued expansion). 
 28.  See Charter of the Organization of American States (as amended) arts. 39(a), 41–44, 46 & 52, 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.pdf (outlining 
how member states should cooperate to achieve, inter alia, regional integration). The original OAS 
Charter did not include any express commitment to integration; see Charter of the OAS, Apr. 30, 1948, 
119 U.N.T.S. 1609. The integration-related provisions were introduced by the Protocol of Amendment 
to the Charter of the Organization of American States (“Protocol of Buenos Aires”) art. VIII, Feb. 27, 
1967, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-31_Protocol_of_Buenos_Aires.htm, whose preamble expressed 
the OAS member states’ commitment “to speed up the process of economic integration.” Id. pmbl.   
 29.  Detlef Nolte, Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented 
Regional Governance Complex? 2 (European University Institute Working Paper RSCAS 2014/89, 
Sept. 2014). 
 30.  In 2008, aiming at integrating Mercosur and the Andean Community, their member states, 
plus Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, signed the constitutive treaty of the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR, in force since 2011), which may eventually displace the subregional organizations 
but so far has not done so. See, e.g., José Briceño-Ruiz & Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Post-Hegemonic 
Regionalism, UNASUR, and the Reconfiguration of Regional Cooperation in South America, 40 CAN. J. 
LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 48 (2015) (discussing the creation of UNASUR in the context of 
Latin American regionalism). 
 31.  Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 2140 U.N.T.S. 
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as the fifth full member,32 and Bolivia is in the process of becoming the sixth.33 
The Treaty of Asunción expressed the objective of establishing a common 
market by December 31, 1994,34 but it did not provide for any effective 
mechanism in the Treaty’s mere twenty-four articles by which the laws and 
policies necessary for its creation were to be put in place. Only two decision-
making bodies, the Council of the Common Market and the Common Market 
Group, were established, and both were composed of governmental 
representatives from all member states—at the ministerial level in the Council 
and lower ranks in the Common Market Group. Beyond some basic allocation 
of responsibilities, “the final institutional structure of the administrative organs 
of the common market, as well as the specific powers of each organ” were left 
to be determined prior to the establishment of the common market, that is, 
before December 31, 1994.35 This eventually occurred in the Protocol of Ouro 
Preto.36 Despite institutional minimalism, remarkable initial progress was 
achieved, with internal tariffs abolished for ninety percent of traded goods and 
a uniform external tariff applied to eight-five percent of such goods by the end 
of 1994.37 Since then, hampered by intervening economic crises, political 
disagreements, political and economic imbalance among its members, and 
failure to implement and comply with Mercosur rules domestically, further 
progress has been less smooth.38 As a result, the customs union—a key step 
toward a common market—remains imperfect,39 and intragroup trade as a 
percentage of overall exports is less today than it was in the late 1990s.40 
No Mercosur treaty or protocol mentions subsidiarity as a guiding principle 
for the exercise of competences within the organization.41 An apparent 
 
257 [hereinafter Treaty of Asunción]. 
 32.  See Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Mercosur at Twenty: From Adolescence to Adulthood?, 27 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 34–35 (2013) (discussing Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur). 
 33.  See Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Mercosur: Protocol for Accession of Bolivia Approved (Aug. 
18, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/mercosur-protocol-for-accession-of-bolivia-
approved/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).    
 34.  Treaty of Asunción, supra note 31, art. 1. 
 35.  Id. art. 18. 
 36.  Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, Dec. 
17, 1994, 2145 U.N.T.S. 298 [hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Preto]. 
 37.  Karsten Bechle, Kein Auslaufmodell: 20 Jahre Mercosur, GIGA FOCUS no. 3 at 3 (2011), 
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_lateinamerika_1103.pdf.  
 38.  See id. at 4–5 (addressing factors that have impeded further integration); see also Laura 
Gómez-Mera, Obstacles to Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, in REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE TREATY OF ROME: THE EU, ASIA, AFRICA AND THE 
AMERICAS 111 (Joaquín Roy & Roberto Domínguez eds., 2008) (discussing compliance and 
implementation gaps in regional organizations in Latin America, including Mercosur).  
 39.  Finn Laursen, Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, 
the Americas and East Asia, in COMPARATIVE REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND 239, 
250 (Finn Laursen ed., 2010).  
 40.  UNITED NATIONS, UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS 2014 at 41 (2014).  
 41.  See, e.g., Roberto D. Bloch, El Principio de Subsidiariedad en la Unión Europea y en el 
Mercosur, in LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL MERCOSUR: LA EVOLUCIÓN DE UN NUEVO ACTOR EN LAS 
RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES 137, 143 (2003) (noting the absence of subsidiarity in Mercosur’s 
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explanation for this absence, in line with the first conjecture,42 is that Mercosur 
has been designed as a purely intergovernmental organization and continues to 
operate as such.43 Though the Protocol of Ouro Preto increased the number of 
official Mercosur organs to six,44 three of these—the Joint Parliamentary 
Commission, which later became the Mercosur Parliament;45 the Economic–
Social Consultative Forum; and the Administrative Secretariat—have 
consultative and supportive functions, but no consequential decision-making 
authority.46 The three bodies that do—the Council of the Common Market, the 
Common Market Group, and the newly introduced Mercosur Trade 
Commission—can issue legally binding decisions, resolutions, and directives.47 
Not only are all three composed of government representatives, but their 
decisions also need to be adopted “by consensus and in the presence of all the 
States Parties.”48 There is no majoritarian decisionmaking or “pooled 
sovereignty,” and hence there is no genuine supranational authority in 
Mercosur,49 nor do its constitutive instruments provide for any express 
stipulation as to which of Mercosur’s broadly defined competences are 
exclusive and which ones are shared with the member states.50 Each government 
can veto decisions that it thinks should not be considered at the level of 
Mercosur or with which it simply disagrees. Thus, there is no obvious demand 
for subsidiarity, as each government retains full control over which decisions 
should be made domestically versus at the regional level. 
Rather than at the level of intergovernmental organs, subsidiarity might 
instead surface as part of Mercosur dispute settlement. Annex III to the Treaty 
of Asunción51 and the 1991 Protocol of Brasilia52 first implemented basic 
elements of Mercosur third-party dispute settlement, which the 2002 Protocol of 
Olivos replaced with a more elaborate system.53 The current system essentially 
 
constitutive instruments); FELIX FUDERS, DIE WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG DES MERCOSUR 75, 587 
(2008) (noting the absence in Mercosur of a subsidiarity principle).  
 42.  See supra Part II. 
 43.  See MARIANNE KLUMPP, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT UND STÄNDIGES REVISIONSGERICHT 
DES MERCOSUR 64–67 (2013); Santiago Deluca, La subsidiariedad y las competencias de la Unión 
Europea y el Mercosur, 2 REVISTA LATINOAMERICA DE DERECHO, no. 4, 125, 144–47 (2005) (both 
discussing intergovernmental nature of Mercosur and the absence of supranational elements); see also 
Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 36, art. 2 (referring to Mercosur’s decision-making bodies as “inter-
governmental organs”). 
 44.  Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 36, art. 1. 
 45.  Protocol on the Establishment of the Mercosur Parliament, Dec. 9, 2005, 2444 U.N.T.S. 172.  
 46.  See Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 36, arts. 26, 29 & 32. 
 47.  Id. arts. 9, 15 & 20. 
 48.  Id. art. 37. 
 49.  KLUMPP, supra note 43, at 70 (noting the lack of autonomy of Mercosur organs). 
 50.  FUDERS, supra note 41, at 75, 587 (noting the imprecisely defined competences of Mercosur).   
 51.  Treaty of Asunción, supra note 31, annex III. 
 52.  Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, Dec. 17, 1991, 2145 U.N.T.S. 25. 
 53.  Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur, Feb. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 2 (2003) 
[hereinafter Protocol of Olivos]. See generally Raúl Vinuesa, The Mercosur Settlement of Disputes 
System, 5 L. & PRACT. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIB. 77, 83–87 (2006). 
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follows the WTO model, rather than that of the EU, providing both for 
arbitration before a three-member ad hoc tribunal if a dispute cannot be settled 
through direct negotiations as well as for the possibility of requesting review of 
an arbitral award’s legal arguments by a Permanent Review Tribunal (PRT).54 
The members of the ad hoc tribunals and the PRT are, as to be expected from 
judicial bodies, formally independent. Unlike the other decision-making organs 
within Mercosur, the ad hoc tribunals and the PRT are thus in a position to 
impose, by way of judicial lawmaking through treaty interpretation, legal 
obligations upon member states that these have not consensually agreed upon.55 
So far, however, subsidiarity has not played any role in Mercosur 
jurisprudence. Indeed, the lack of jurisprudence so far is in part due to the fact 
that Mercosur members remain free to take trade complaints to the WTO 
dispute-settlement body instead of to Mercosur tribunals.56 As of early 2016, ten 
arbitral awards had been issued under the rules of the Protocol of Brasilia, two 
under the revised rules of the Protocol of Olivos, and six awards and three 
advisory opinions by the PRT.57 No case mentions “subsidiarity,” the “margin of 
appreciation,” or other related concepts. 
At the same time, however, both the institutional design of the dispute-
settlement system and the practice of the arbitral tribunals can be interpreted to 
imply considerations of subsidiarity. Institutionally, the absence of compulsory 
jurisdiction of a permanent court and the apparent preference for ad hoc 
arbitration, with its greater control over the appointment of arbitrators and 
procedural issues, is indicative of a preference for maintaining greater control 
over Mercosur dispute settlement by the member states and thus of subsidiarity 
in its allocative function. In their jurisprudence, Mercosur tribunals have 
emphasized the organization’s intergovernmental character and distinguished it 
from the EU’s supranationality.58 They have, moreover, differed in spelling out 
the concrete remedial obligations that follow from an adverse finding, leaving 
the question of how to execute awards in some cases—and thus granting at least 
some margin of appreciation—to the respondent states.59 In one award, the 
Tribunal articulated what might be identified as a “factual” understanding of 
subsidiarity when it noted that national authorities could regulate certain 
matters as long as Mercosur had not done so; the Tribunal did not, however, 
specify any normative criteria Mercosur would have to meet to preempt 
 
 54.  Protocol of Olivos, supra note 53, arts. 6(1), 17(1) & 17(2). The parties can also decide to 
submit their case directly to the PRT, which then has the same jurisdiction as the ad hoc tribunals. See 
id. art. 23.  
 55.  KLUMPP, supra note 43, at 68–69. 
 56.  See Protocol of Olivos, supra note 53, art. 1(2). 
 57.  See awards and advisory opinions at Sistema de Solución de Controversias, TRIBUNAL 
PERMANENTE DE REVISIÓN, http://www.tprmercosur.org/es/sol_controversias.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2016).  
 58.  Uru. v. Arg., Arbitral Award of Sept. 6, 2006, para. 150, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal 
%20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/TPR_Tribunal%20AdHoc_Laudo%20Libre%20Circulaci
on_ES.pdf.   
 59.  See KLUMPP, supra note 43, at 251–53. 
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national regulation.60 In the absence of such criteria, this approach effectively 
privileges one national actor, the executive, over other domestic actors, such as 
the legislature; unlike the latter, the executive could use Mercosur to stave off 
national regulation by other domestic actors. In short, although certain judicial 
pronouncements might be interpreted in terms of the subsidiarity principle, no 
related judicial doctrine has thus far been articulated by the Mercosur tribunals. 
In conclusion, given the absence of genuine multilevel governance in 
Mercosur, the continuing centrality of state consent due to the prevalence of 
consensual decisionmaking, and an institutionally weak dispute-settlement 
system, there has so far been little pressing need for a formal subsidiarity 
principle, a finding that meets the expectations under the first three demand 
conjectures previously articulated.61 Because Mercosur regulation remains 
squarely focused on managing economic transactions and externalities—
Mercosur does not possess any competence in the field of human rights, for 
example—the probability of the supply of a subsidiarity principle is low on that 
account as well, in line with the fourth conjecture.62 If subsidiarity has played a 
role within Mercosur, it has been with respect to allocating exclusive politico–
legal decision-making authority to—or, rather keeping it in—the hands of 
national executives, reflecting “member states’ desire to achieve economic 
integration through political cooperation rather than institutionalism.”63 
Implementation and enforcement of Mercosur norms and decisions likewise 
remain the member states’ responsibility.64 The strong position of presidents in 
Latin American political systems has made Mercosur and its further 
development effectively subject to “member state presidential diplomacy,” 
resulting in a “state of affairs . . . described as interpresidentialism.”65 When 
actors other than the executive, including subnational actors such as the 
constituent entities of federal states, have sought to exert influence on Mercosur 
policymaking, this has happened through informal channels and procedures.66 
The actual impact of such informal attempts, however, always remains 
conditional on the willingness of national executives to act according to them at 
the level of Mercosur decisionmaking. 
 
 60.  Brza. v. Arg., Arbitral Award of May 21, 2001, para. 110, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/ 
portal%20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/IV%20LAUDO.pdf.  
 61.  See supra Part II. 
 62.  See id. 
 63.  Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent 
for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and Mercosur, 17 J. INT’L L. & BUS. 850, 867–68 (1996-97). 
 64.  Ljiljana Biukovic, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Regional Trade Agreements: South 
American and Caribbean Modalities, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 255, 270–71 (2008). 
 65.  Porrata-Doria, supra note 32, at 15–16. 
 66.  See Marcelo de Almeidas Medeiros, Multi-Level Governance and the Problem of Balance 
within Mercosur, in MERCOSUR: BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 75, 75 (Francisco 
Domínguez & Marcos Aurélio Guedes de Oliveira eds., 2004).  
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B. Andean Community  
The Andean Community (AC) was founded by the 1969 Cartagena 
Agreement,67 known at the time as the Andean Pact, and currently has four 
members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Institutionally enhanced 
through subsequent protocols and decisions,68 it was fully overhauled and 
received its present name in 1996;69 further reforms followed in 1997.70 The AC’s 
declared objective is “balanced and harmonious development . . . through 
economic and social integration and cooperation.”71 
That the AC has taken some institutional design cues from the European 
Communities and later the EU accounts for a number of differences between 
the AC and Mercosur. First, the current institutional setup that defines the 
“Andean Integration System” is denser and more diversified, though not 
necessarily more effective.72 It is composed of no less than ten main organs and 
a number of additional entities.73 Second, the AC’s institutional setup contains 
certain nominally supranational elements that are missing from Mercosur. 
Although the AC’s Presidential Council, the Council of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers, and the Commission are all intergovernmental in nature,74 the 
General Secretariat, the AC’s executive body75 headed by a formally 
independent General Secretary,76 is to be staffed with officials chosen primarily 
 
 67.  Agreement on Andean Sub-Regional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969). 
 68.  See Treaty Creating the Andean Tribunal of Justice, May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979); 
Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament, Oct. 25, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 269; Protocol of Cochabamba 
Amending the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1996, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/pcjca/trt_pcjca.pdf; Additional Protocol to the Treaty 
Establishing the Andean Parliament, April 23, 1997, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties 
/en/pteap/trt_pteap.pdf; Instrument for the Creation of the Andean Presidential Council, May 23, 1990, 
in Acta de Machu Picchu 7, http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Presidencial/CP_01.doc 
(in Spanish).  
 69.  Protocol of Amendment Establishing the Andean Community and the Andean Integration 
System (Protocol of Trujillo), Mar. 10, 1996, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp? 
file_id=224901. 
 70.  Protocol of Sucre, June 25, 1997, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/junac/Carta_Ag/sucre_e.asp. 
See generally José Luís da Cruz Vilaça & José Manuel Sobrino Heredia, The European Union and the 
Transformation of the Andean Pact into the Andean Community: From the Trujillo Protocol to the Sucre 
Act, 3 EUR. FOR. AFF. REV. 13, 27–36 (1998). A consolidated version of the text of the Cartagena 
Agreement is available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/JUNAC/Decisiones/dec563e.asp (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement (as amended)].  
 71.  Cartagena Agreement (as amended), supra note 70, art. 1. 
 72.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective 
International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean 
Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1, 1 n. 3 (2009) (noting that “most commentators have ignored the 
Andean Community or dismissed it as a failure”). 
 73.  Cartagena Agreement (as amended), supra note 70, art. 6. 
 74.  Id. arts. 11 (Andean Presidential Council), 15 (Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs), 21 
(Commission of the Andean Community). 
 75.  Id. art. 29. 
 76.  Id. art. 32 (“During his term in office, the General Secretary shall not be able to carry out any 
other activity; nor will he seek or accept instructions from any government, national entity or 
international body.”). 
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for merit,77 and its purpose is to “act[] solely in accordance with the interests of 
the sub-region.”78 Not only are these aspects important to the Secretariat’s 
competence of initiating Community legislation, which is shared with the 
member states, but the Secretariat can also issue binding resolutions that 
become part of the “legal system of the Cartagena Agreement.”79 Another 
supranational element is the Commission’s power to adopt the principal 
legislative instrument, known as Decisions, by absolute majority, or, with 
respect to a list of enumerated issues, by absolute majority so long as no 
negative vote is cast. By contrast, Decisions by the Council of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers, which are also part of AC law, require consensus.80 Third, AC law, 
like EU law, formally enjoys both supremacy over national law and direct effect 
within national legal orders. Owing to a lack of agreement on these issues at the 
time of the ratification of the original Andean Pact, legal stipulations to these 
effects are found in the Treaty creating the Andean Court of Justice (ACJ) 
rather than in the Cartagena Agreement.81 
The creation of a supranational multilevel governance arrangement with 
pooled sovereignty should, per conjectures one and two,82 increase the 
likelihood of the inclusion of a competence-selecting principle such as 
subsidiarity. Yet despite the otherwise liberal borrowing of institutional 
elements from the European model and the fact that major institutional reforms 
were implemented after subsidiarity had made its formal appearance in the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty, the principle is not explicitly mentioned in any of the 
AC’s constitutive legal instruments.83 Although a detailed academic proposal to 
amend the existing treaties to include subsidiarity as a competence-selecting 
principle within the AC has surfaced,84 at the political level there has been little 
meaningful debate about the desirability of adopting a subsidiarity principle 
and no initiative to introduce it.85 The likely explanation for this absence, in line 
 
 77.  Id. arts. 35 (Directors-General) & 37 (technical and administrative staff). 
 78.  Id. art. 29. 
 79.  ACJ Treaty (as amended), supra note 68, arts. 1(d) & 4.  
 80.  Cartagena Agreement (as amended), supra note 70, arts. 17 & 26. 
 81.  Decisions by the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers or of the Commission and Resolutions 
of the General Secretariat shall be directly applicable in Member Countries. ACJ Treaty (as amended), 
supra note 68, art. 3. Member states are obliged to comply “with the provisions comprising the legal 
system of the Andean Community” and must “refrain from adopting or employing any such measure as 
may be contrary to those provisions or that may in any way restrict their application.” Id. art. 4 
(echoing a similar provision in EU law, which is now codified in the TEU, supra note 4, art. 4 (3)). 
Citing to CJEU jurisprudence, the ACJ affirmed the supremacy and direct effect of AC law in its first 
judgments. See Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 72, at 16 n.76.  
 82.  See supra Part II. 
 83.  Marvin Vargas Alfaro, Los Principios Generales del Derecho Comunitario y Andino, REVISTA 
DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO, INTERNACIONAL Y DERECHOS HUMANOS no. 2 at sec. E.1 (2012), 
http://www.derechocomunitario.ucr.ac.cr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200%3Ap
rincipios-generales-derecho-comunitario-andino-vargas-alfaro&Itemid=4 (noting the absence of 
subsidiarity in AC legal instruments).  
 84.  DANIEL ACHÁ, EL PRINCIPIO DE SUBSIDIARIEDAD: CLAVE JURÍDICA DE LA INTEGRACIÓN 
113–16 (2013). 
 85.  Id. at 13. 
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with conjecture four,86 is the primarily externality-regulating nature of the AC 
in the area of economic transactions—like Mercosur, the AC does not have any 
competence in the area of human rights—which may be seen as arguing against 
providing member states with greater regulatory and policy freedoms. 
Nor is there a general subsidiarity principle to be found in the ACJ’s 
jurisprudence. To the contrary, under the ACJ’s complemento indispensable 
principle, member states may enact domestic legislation in areas governed by 
AC law only to the extent that these measures serve the implementation of, and 
do not conflict with, AC norms.87 Elsewhere, however, the Court has taken a 
more measured approach. For example, in one decision, the ACJ noted that 
issue areas falling within the Community’s competence also remain “within the 
competence of the national legislator for an indefinite [sic] time until they are 
effectively covered by the Community norms.”88 In another decision, the ACJ 
“coupled its recognition of shared legislative authority with deference to state 
actors to determine the boundaries between Andean and national authority”89 
and it has generally refrained from directing domestic courts to apply its 
responses from preliminary ruling requests to the facts of the case, despite 
having authority to do so under the 1996 Cochabamba Protocol.90 Overall, it 
appears that the ACJ’s approach to the relationship between member states 
and AC institutions as they exercise competences comprises a mix of 
considerations that cannot yet be condensed into a straightforward judicial 
subsidiarity doctrine. 
In sum, although the formal institutional design of the Andean Community 
ostensibly makes it a much more likely candidate than Mercosur for the 
adoption and operation of subsidiarity, so far no such principle has been 
articulated either at the level of the AC’s constitutive legal instruments or in the 
ACJ’s jurisprudence. 
IV 
SUBSIDIARITY IN AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES 
In addition to the African Union (AU) and its precursor, the Organization 
of African Unity, there have been at least nineteen attempts to create new or 
reforming and strengthening existing organizational schemes for the economic 
or political integration of subregional groups of African states in the post–
World War II era.91 Moreover, in 1991, the Organization of African Unity 
 
 86.  See supra Part II.  
 87.  See, e.g., ACJ, Ruling 15-IP-2014, paras. 45–46 (Apr. 30, 2014); Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. 
Helfer, Legal Integration in the Andes: Law-Making by the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 17 EUR. L. J. 
701, 711 (2011) [hereinafter Legal Integration in the Andes]; Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, 
Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice, 64 INT’L. ORG. 563, 571 (2010). I thank Larry Helfer for pointing out this doctrine to me.  
 88.  Legal Integration in the Andes, supra note 87, at 712 (quoting ATJ, Ruling 2-IP-90, point 1). 
 89.  Alter & Helfer, Legal Integration in the Andes, supra note 87, at 712. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  WOLFF-CHRISTIAN PETERS, THE QUEST FOR AN AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: 
2-VON STADEN INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:45 PM 
40 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:27 
proclaimed the creation of a continental African Economic Community (AEC), 
which is to come about “through the co-ordination, harmonization and 
progressive integration of the activities of regional economic communities.”92 
There are currently eight such “Regional Economic Communities” (RECs) 
recognized by the AU as AEC building blocks,93 and many states belong to 
more than one:94 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community 
(EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States, the Arab 
Maghreb Union, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and the 
Intergovernmental Agency for Development.95 Only the first four are currently 
sufficiently effective to serve as reliable building blocks for the AEC.96 The 
principle of subsidiarity has made a formal appearance in several RECs as well 
as in documents outlining the relationship between the AU and RECs in 
security matters.97 
 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ITS ROLE IN ACHIEVING AFRICAN UNITY—THE CASE OF SADC 64–
66 (2010).  
 92.  Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community art. 88(1), June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 
(1991); see also Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 33; Protocol 
on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, July 3, 2007, https:/ 
/caast-net-plus.org/object/document/239/attach/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf. Further pronouncements that 
the “ultimate goal of the African Union is full political and economic integration leading to the United 
States of Africa,” AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 90 (V) (July 4-5, 2005), have so far remained 
aspirational.  
 93.  See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.112 (vii) (July 1–2, 2006) 
(suspension of recognition of further RECs beyond the eight already recognized). See generally 
Richard Frimpong Oppong, The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa’s 
Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 92 (2010). 
 94.  JAMES T. GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 65–85 
(2011); see also ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN 
AFRICA (ARIA V): TOWARD AN AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA 78 (2012) (“Six 
African countries are members of one REC, 26 are members of two RECs, 20 are members of three 
RECs, and one country belongs to four RECs.”).  
 95.  See generally GATHII, supra note 94, 143–242 (discussing key institutional elements and trade 
liberalization policies of the eight recognized RECs, plus of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States).  
 96.  See PETERS, supra note 91, at 105–07; RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 11 n. 19 (2011) (noting that the other four RECs have 
“witnessed very little progress in their economic integration process”).  
 97.  See Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security 
between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the Coordinating Mechanisms 
of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa art. IV (iv), June 2008, 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eng.pdf (affirming “adherence to the principles of 
subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimize the partnership 
between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of 
peace, security and stability”). However, the Memorandum also asserts “recognition of, and respect for, 
the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and 
stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 16 of the P[eace and] [S]ecurity C[ouncil] Protocol.” Id. 
art. IV(ii). How these conflicting stipulations are to be reconciled remains unresolved. See AFRICAN 
UNION, AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: 2010 ASSESSMENT STUDY 67 (2010) 
(noting the lack of clarity as to the application of subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs in 
practice).  
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A. Economic Community of West African States  
ECOWAS was founded in 1975.98 After failing to achieve its ambitious goal 
of bringing about a customs union within fifteen years of its creation, the 
organization was redesigned in 1993,99 and further changes were introduced by 
subsequent protocols.100 The revised treaty set the even more demanding 
objective of establishing an economic union that comprises a common market 
and a monetary union within fifteen years.101 In its preamble, it furthermore 
expressly recognizes that “integration of the Member States into a viable 
regional Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national 
sovereignties to the Community” and affirms the “need to establish Community 
Institutions vested with relevant and adequate powers.”102 
The types and nomenclature of many of the organs of the current ECOWAS 
governance architecture suggest that ECOWAS has begun to follow the 
institutional blueprint of the EU and to move, at least in theory, toward 
supranational governance. The two highest decision-making bodies, however, 
remain intergovernmental. At the top, the so-called Authority of Heads of State 
and Government is responsible for taking “all measures to ensure [the 
Community’s] progressive development and the realisation of its objectives.”103 
Just below it, the Council of Ministers has certain decision-making powers of its 
own, including those that derive from acts of delegation by the Authority.104 
There is an ECOWAS Parliament105 that is to be eventually directly elected by 
the people of the member states and whose powers are foreseen to be 
“progressively enhanced from advisory to co-decision making and subsequently 
to law making in areas to be defined by the Authority.”106 Neither has occurred, 
so the parliament remains limited to an advisory and consultative role.107 In 
 
 98.  Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1200. The 
ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
 99.  Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, July 24, 1993, 2373 
U.N.T.S. 233 [hereinafter Treaty of Cotonou]. See generally KOFI OTENG KUFOUR, THE 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 35–
68 (2006) (discussing the 1993 revisions of the ECOWAS Treaty). 
 100.  See Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/12/01Amending Articles 1, 3, 6, and 21 of the Revised 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, Dec. 21, 2001; Supplementary Protocol 
A/SP.1/06/06 Amending the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, June 14, 2006 [hereinafter Suppl. Protocol of 
Abuja]. The texts of the protocols are available at ECOWAS, LEGAL DOCUMENTS, 
http://documentation.ecowas.int/legal-documents/protocols/.  
 101.  Treaty of Cotonou, supra note 99, arts. 3(1), 3(2)(d) and (e) & 54(1). 
 102.  Id. pmbl. 
 103.  Id. art. 7(2). 
 104.  Id. art. 10. 
 105.  Id. art. 13; see also Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament, Aug. 6, 1994, 
http://www.parl.ecowas.int/documents/protocols_eng.pdf. 
 106.  Supplementary Protocol A/SP.3/06/06 Amending Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the 
Community Parliament art. 4 (revising art. 6 (2)), June 14, 2006, http://www.parl.ecowas.int/documents 
/protocols_eng.pdf.  
 107.  See Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States, Strategic Plan of the 
ECOWAS Parliament (Third Legislature) 2011–2015, ¶¶ 2 & 19–20, http://www.parl.ecowas.int/ 
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2006, the Executive Secretariat was transformed into the “ECOWAS 
Commission,”108 now consisting of fifteen Commissioners,109 and was given the 
competence to “formulate proposals that will enable the Authority and Council 
to make decisions on the main orientations of policies of Member States and 
the Community.”110 Lastly, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has been 
operational since 2001,111 and its judgements are “binding on the Member 
States, the Institutions of the Community and on individuals and corporate 
bodies.”112 The 2006 reforms also clarified the supranational nature of the 
various ECOWAS law-making instruments, again taking cues from the EU 
model.113 All Community Acts are to be adopted either by unanimity, 
consensus, or—and this is new—a two-thirds majority.114 Which standard will 
apply to which types of decisions, however, is not specified. 
The reforms have thus paved the ground for the introduction of 
supranationality into the governance architecture of ECOWAS,115 which could 
open up space for subsidiarity to operate. Though none of the treaties and 
protocols explicitly mentions subsidiarity, the principle surfaces in a number of 
Community documents, such as the ECOWAS Vision 2020,116 the 2007–2010 
 
documents/Strategic_Plan_Final_Eng.pdf.   
 108.  Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, arts. 1 & 2 (introducing new art. 17 into Treaty of 
Cotonou). 
 109.  Economic Community of West African States, Decision Expanding the Management Cadre of 
the ECOWAS Commission and Increasing the Number of Commissioner Positions to Fifteen, Feb. 28, 
2013, ECOWAS Doc. A/DEC.4/02/13, http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents 
/regulations/acts/15%20Commissioners.pdf.  
 110.  See Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, art. 2 (introducing new Article 19(5) into Treaty 
of Cotonou).  
 111.  Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Jacqueline McAlister, A New International Human 
Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 748 
(2013). 
 112.  Treaty of Cotonou, supra note 99, art. 15(4). 
 113.  The Authority’s Supplementary Acts are binding and have direct effect in member states. 
Council Regulations have the same effects; whereas directives are binding only with respect to their 
objectives, Council decisions are binding for those to whom they are addressed. The ECOWAS 
Commission “may adopt Rules relating to the execution of Acts enacted by the Council of Ministers,” 
and these “[r]ules . . . shall have the same legal force as Acts adopted by Council for the execution of 
which the Rules are adopted.” See Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, art. 2 (introducing new art. 
9 into Treaty of Cotonou). Compare this with the provision on the EU’s secondary legislation in TFEU, 
supra note 26, art. 288. 
 114.  Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, art. 2 (introducing new art. 9(8) into Treaty of 
Cotonou). 
 115.  Currently most of the supranational potential of these reforms continues to exist more in 
theory than in practice, and decisionmaking remains centered in the Authority; see STEFAN PLENK, 
REGIONALE INTEGRATION IM SUB-SAHARISCHEN AFRIKA: EINE ANALYSE VON EAC, SADC UND 
ECOWAS 399, 418 (2015) (noting that the supranational potential of ECOWAS institutions remains 
largely theoretical); Jadesola O. Lokulo-Sodipe & Abiodun J. Osuntogun, The Quest for a 
Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the Economic Community of West African States Attain the 
Status?, 16 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTR. L. J. 255, 278, 282 (2013); Chidebe M. Nwankwo, Jr., 
Legitimation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A Normative and 
Institutional Inquiry 225–26 (June 2014) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Brunel University), 
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/9387/1/FulltextThesis.pdf.  
 116.  ECOWAS Vision 2020: Toward a Democratic and Prosperous Community 7 (June 2010) 
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Strategic Plan,117 and some other policy documents and reports.118 In most of 
these, subsidiarity is mentioned simply as a presumptive ECOWAS principle 
without further elaboration as to any criteria according to which it should 
operate. One document defines subsidiarity as “intended to identify all 
stakeholders with specific competencies and comparative advantages in their 
operational areas and assign them tasks relating to their specialised fields of 
endeavour.”119 While this “comparative advantage” notion might function as a 
suitable criterion for switching between competences, this definition, applying 
to “all stakeholders,” no longer necessarily revolves around different levels of 
politico–legal authority and is linked to policy implementation, not 
policymaking.120 Subsidiarity is also mentioned in the legally binding 2008 
Supplementary Act on Environmental Policy.121 The Act describes subsidiarity 
as a “guiding principle” according to which the “Community shall only deal 
with, at the regional level, matters that cannot be better treated at the national 
or local level. It is accepted that national competence shall be the rule, and 
Community competence the exception.”122 While the Act expresses 
subsidiarity’s presumption for the local, it adopts a quite indeterminate 
criterion—“better treated”—for determining whether the appropriate level of 
governance is national or supranational. Subsidiarity continues to be invoked 
occasionally in political statements, but again without specification of the 
specific conditions under which ECOWAS, rather than the member states, 
should act.123 
The ECOWAS Court of Justice should be a most likely candidate for the 
application of the subsidiarity principle, especially because it has been given 
formal jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights complaints.124 Surprisingly, 
however, the Court’s human rights jurisdiction comes without the most 
 
http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ECOWAS-VISION-2020.pdf.  
 117.  ECOWAS Strategic Plan 2007-2010 at 24, 25, 53 (May 2007) (on file with author). The 2011-
2015 version, however, no longer mentions subsidiarity; see ECOWAS Regional Strategic Plan 2011-
2015 (Sept. 2010), http://www.spu.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/REGIONAL-STRATEGIC-
PLAN-RFV-in-English.pdf.  
 118.  See, e.g., ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy 23 & 41 (2015), http://www.ecreee.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/ecowas_renewable_energy_policy.pdf.  
 119.  ECOWAS Draft Community Development Programme 92 (Dec. 2012), http://events.ecowas 
.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CDP-Doc_Draft1_EN_Translated_070313.pdf.  
 120.  Id. at 184. 
 121.  ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/SA.4/12/08 Relating to the ECOWAS Environmental Policy 
art. 7 (1)(a) (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.ecowas.us/files/ecowas_environment_policy.pdf.  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  See, e.g., Final Communiqué of High Level Coordination Meeting of ECOWAS Partners on 
the Fight against Ebola Virus Disease, press release 009/2015 para. 7 (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=009&lang=en&annee=2015 (stressing respect, inter alia, for 
principle of subsidiarity “as guiding principle for effective coordination among stakeholders” in the 
Ebola crisis).  
 124.  Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the 
Community Court of Justice art. 4, Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/ 
pdf_files/supplementaryprotocol.pdf.  
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common subsidiarity criterion in this context:125 the requirement to exhaust 
domestic remedies before a case becomes admissible in an international 
tribunal.126 The Court itself has repeatedly affirmed that the absence of this 
requirement is not an unintended oversight, and it has refused to import the 
exhaustion of local remedies into ECOWAS law as a generally recognized 
principle in human rights litigation beyond the state,127 effectively turning itself 
into a human rights court of first instance.128 An initiative in 2009 by The 
Gambia to introduce an exhaustion requirement failed.129 On the other hand, in 
a practice that protects domestic judicial authority, the Court refuses to 
adjudicate cases that have already been decided by domestic courts in the 
member states, reasoning that it is not an appellate court.130 This approach to 
overlapping levels of competence thus yields mixed results, denying deference 
in one respect and granting it in another. 
This brief review suggests that subsidiarity has a potential role to play in 
ECOWAS, but the manner in which it is being invoked and, less frequently, 
defined, also reveals that it has not yet been subject to a systematic and 
coherent articulation. This may be due, in part, to the fact that ECOWAS, 
despite its potential for genuinely supranational governance architecture, in 
practice still largely operates as an intergovernmental, rather than a 
supranational, organization.131 
B. East African Community 
The reestablished132 EAC, comprised of the founding members Uganda, 
Kenya, and Tanzania, plus Rwanda and Burundi, ambitiously aims both at 
economic integration in the form of a common market and a monetary union, 
and at the eventual creation of a “political federation.”133 The EAC is currently 
 
 125.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 126.  Id. 
 127. See generally Amos Enabulele, Sailing Against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and 
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 56 J. AFR. L. 268 (2012) (analyzing the Court’s position on 
the exhaustion of domestic remedies doctrine). 
 128.  Solomon Ebobrah, Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice, 54 J. AFR. L. 1, 9 (2010). 
 129.  Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against International Courts 
in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences 10 (iCourts Working Paper No. 21, Aug. 
30, 2015). 
 130.  See Ebobrah, supra note 128, 9–10, 15–16 (noting instances in which the ECCJ refused to hear 
or to decide cases involving domestic judgments on the basis of the argument that it was not a court of 
appeal). 
 131.  See, e.g., id. at 12. 
 132.  The first EAC had been created by the Treaty for East African Co-Operation, June 6, 1967, 6 
I.L.M. 932, but collapsed again in 1977. See Domenico Mazzeo, The Experience of the East African 
Community: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation in Africa, in AFRICAN 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 150 (Domenico Mazzeo ed., 1984). 
 133.  Treaty Establishing the East African Community art. 5 (2), Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255. 
The treaty has been amended in 2006 and 2007, the consolidated version of the text is available at 
http://www.eac.int/sites/default/files/docs/treaty_eac_amended-2006_1999.pdf [hereinafter EAC Treaty 
(as amended)].  
2-VON STADEN INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2016  5:45 PM 
No. 2 2016] SUBSIDIARITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES 45 
the only African regional organization that includes an express reference to the 
principle of subsidiarity in its founding instrument as one of the “operational 
principles” of the Community. According to the EAC Treaty, “the practical 
achievement of the objectives of the Community” is to be governed by “the 
principle of subsidiarity with emphasis on multi-level participation and the 
involvement of a wide range of stake-holders in the process of integration.”134 
This formulation could still be read to imply the EU version of the principle, 
with an additional emphasis on the participation of various stakeholders across 
different levels. An article on interpreting the Treaty’s key terms, by contrast, 
defines subsidiarity as a “principle which emphasises multilevel participation of 
a wide range of participants in the process of economic integration.”135 In this 
definition, participation by stakeholders across levels is made the defining 
characteristic of the principle as it applies, expressis verbis, to economic 
integration, but possibly not to political integration, at least when applying the 
principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius.136 
This definitional incongruence aside, the governance architecture of the 
EAC remains ultimately intergovernmental in character. There is an East 
African Legislative Assembly (EALA) whose members are to be elected by 
national parliaments137 and that makes decisions, including on legislative bills, 
on the basis of simple majorities.138 However, its bills become “Acts of the 
Community” only when subsequently “assented to” by the Summit of Heads of 
State,139 whose decisions require consensus.140 The intergovernmental, 
ministerial-level Council is the Community’s “policy organ,” which can initiate 
and submit bills to the Assembly and, echoing again EU secondary legislation,141 
“make regulations, issue directives [and] take decisions”142 that “shall be binding 
on the Partner States, on all organs and institutions of the Community other 
than the Summit, the Court and the Assembly within their jurisdictions, and on 
those to whom they may under this Treaty be addressed.”143 Although the 
Council can make some decisions by simple majority, decisions to submit a bill 
to the Assembly and recommendations on treaty amendments and protocols, 
among others, require consensus.144 The EAC’s Secretariat has no policy-
 
 134.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 7(1)(d). 
 135.  Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 136.  Under this interpretive principle, the express mentioning of one thing (for example, an 
objective, beneficiary, or exception) is inferred to mean that other things that are not mentioned are 
excluded; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). 
 137.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 50.  
 138.  Id. art. 58(1). 
 139.  Id. art. 62(1). 
 140.  Id. art. 12(3). 
 141.  Compare TFEU, supra note 26, art. 288. 
 142.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 14(3)(d). 
 143.  Id. art. 16. 
 144.  See id. art. 15(4) (“Subject to a protocol on decision-making, the decisions of the Council shall 
be by consensus.”); see also Protocol on Decision-making by the Council of the EAC art. 2, Apr. 21, 
2001, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=173&Item 
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making competence of its own.145 Notably, the legal status of the “Acts of the 
Community,” in contrast to the Council’s decisions, is nowhere explicitly 
addressed but might be inferred from the denotation of Council decisions as 
“legislation,” and from the express stipulation of “precedence” of EAC law 
over national law,146 which is unique among African RECs.147 
This leaves the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), operational since 
2001, as a community actor with consequential normative powers not subject to 
direct member-state control. The EAC Treaty gives the Court jurisdiction over 
complaints brought by states,148 the EAC Secretary-General,149 and legal and 
natural persons,150 and it expressly notes that EACJ decisions on the 
interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty shall have precedence over 
decisions of national courts.151 While EACJ jurisdiction over human rights is 
foreseen in the EAC Treaty, subject to a still-to-be adopted future protocol,152 
the Court construed an incidental human rights jurisdiction on the basis of the 
EAC’s “fundamental” and “operational principles,”153 which encompass a 
commitment to “good governance including . . . the recognition, promotion and 
protection of human and peoples’ rights [. . .].”154 Notably, as in ECOWAS, the 
EAC Treaty lacks an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement. The 
Court’s appellate division has affirmed in this respect that the exhaustion of 
local remedies forms part of customary law but noted that “though the Court 
could be flexible and purposeful in the interpretation of the principle of the 
local remedy rule, it must be careful not to distort the express intent of the 
EAC Treaty.”155 
Another EACJ decision—the Court’s very first one—triggered immediate 
treaty amendments, motivated by the Court’s alleged failure to pay due 
deference to the exercise of domestic authority. Less than three weeks after the 
EACJ had issued an interim injunction in 2006 related to charges that the 
 
id=47 (identifying the Council decisions that shall be made by consensus). 
 145.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 71 (outlining functions of the EAC 
Secretariat). 
 146.  Id. art. 8(4). Despite this provision, in its early jurisprudence the East African Court of Justice 
shied away from expressly declaring the supremacy of EAC law. See Anne Pieter van der Mei, Regional 
Integration: The Contribution of the Court of Justice of the East African Community, 69 HEIDELBERG J. 
INT’L L. 403, 421 (2009). 
 147.  See OPPONG, supra note 96, at 312. 
 148.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 28. 
 149.  Id. art. 29(1). 
 150.  Id. art. 30(1). 
 151.  Id. art. 33(2). 
 152.  Id. art. 27(2). 
 153.  Ally Possi, Striking a Balance Between Community Norms and Human Rights: The Continuing 
Struggle of the East African Court of Justice, 15 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 192, 204–09 (2015) (analyzing the 
Court’s jurisprudence on cases involving human rights aspects).   
 154.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 6(d); see also id. art. 7(2) (including among the 
EAC’s operational principles “the maintenance of universally accepted standards of human rights”). 
 155.  Att’y Gen. of Rwanda v. Plaxeda Rugumba, EACJ App. Div., appeal no. 1 of 2012, at 15 
(2015). 
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Kenyan procedure for selecting EALA members infringed Article 50 of the 
EAC Treaty,156 preventing the Kenyan delegates to the EALA from being 
sworn in, the EAC Summit adopted several new amendments. The 
amendments expanded opportunities for removing sitting EACJ judges, 
resulted in the creation of the appellate division, and stipulated that 
“jurisdiction to interpret [the Treaty] shall not include the application of any 
such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner 
States.”157 Article 50, as a case in point, provides that the procedure for selecting 
EALA members shall be determined by the National Assembly of each 
member state.158 The member states thus “rectified” the EACJ’s failure to pay 
deference as a matter of judicial policy by reasserting their exclusive jurisdiction 
through treaty amendments. 
C. The South African Development Community 
In terms of governance architecture, the SADC, founded in 1992,159 is 
essentially intergovernmental in character. The only nonjudicial organ whose 
decisions are binding is the Summit of Heads of State or Government, 
described as SADC’s “supreme policy-making institution.”160 The Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,161 the Council of Ministers,162 the 
Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees,163 and the Standing Committee of 
Officials164 are all composed of members of the national executive branches, and 
the general decision-making rule for all of them is consensus.165 The SADC 
Secretariat and Executive Secretary have purely supportive and administrative 
 
 156.  Henry Onoria, Botched-Up Elections, Treaty Amendments and Judicial Independence in the 
East African Community, 54 J. AFR. L. 74, 77 (2010). 
 157.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 27(1); see also id. art. 30(3) (“The Court shall 
have no jurisdiction under this Article where an Act, regulation, directive, decision or action has been 
reserved under this Treaty to an institution of a Partner State.”).  
 158.  EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 50(1). 
 159.  Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 120 (1993).  
The fifteen members are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The SADC emerged from the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was established in 1980; regarding the SADCC, see Peter 
Meyns, The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and Regional 
Cooperation in Southern Africa, in AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 196 (Domenico Mazzeo ed., 
1984). The SADC Treaty has since been amended on several occasions; for the current version see 
Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (as amended) (Oct. 
21, 2015), available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/4171 [hereinafter SADC 
Treaty (as amended]). 
 160.  SADC Treaty (as amended), supra note 159, arts. 10(1) & 10(9). 
 161.  Id. art. 10A. 
 162.  Id. art. 11. 
 163.  Id. art. 12. 
 164.  Id. art. 13. 
 165.  Id. arts. 10(9), 10A(7), 11(6), 12(8), 13(7); see also id. art. 19 (stipulating consensus as SADC’s 
general decision-making rule, unless otherwise noted).  
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roles.166 The decisions of the SADC Tribunal, which was provided for in the 
1992 Treaty but was effectively established only in 2005, are legally binding and 
final.167 As noted below, however, the Tribunal has become inoperative as a 
result of political backlash against its first controversial decision. 
Subsidiarity is not mentioned in the SADC Treaty, but it became a 
recognized principle in 2001 when the SADC heads of state and government 
unanimously adopted168 the “Report on the Review of the Operations of SADC 
Institutions,”169 which aimed to reform the SADC institutional infrastructure. 
Conspicuously, however, the principle has not been elevated to legally binding 
treaty status as part of any of the subsequent amendments of the SADC 
Treaty.170 The report noted that the pursuit of the SADC’s “common agenda” 
should be guided by several principles, including subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is 
defined in the report as a principle according to which 
all programmes and activities should be undertaken at levels where they can best be 
handled based on consultations between governments and relevant stakeholders. The 
involvement of institutions, authorities, and agencies outside SADC structures to 
initiate and implement regional programmes using their own generated resources 
should be promoted and encouraged.
171
 
Several aspects of this definition are worth noting. First, the principle 
appears to be operating not between the SADC as the regional actor and 
national governments but, instead, between national governments and 
“relevant stakeholders” located at different levels. Second, the criterion for 
determining what is the best actor and level for exercising competence is not 
specified ex ante but is instead made subject to subsequent “consultations.” 
Third, the definition speaks somewhat obliquely of “programmes and activities” 
to be undertaken at the appropriate level, not of lawmaking or policymaking, 
suggesting that the principle, as in the ECOWAS Development Program 
discussed above,172 applies to the implementation, rather than to the making, of 
law and policy.173 Finally, the reference to the promotion and encouragement of 
 
 166.  Id. arts. 14 & 15. 
 167.  Id. art. 16(5); see also Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof, Aug. 7, 2000, 
http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf 
[hereinafter Protocol on Tribunal]. 
 168.  See Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
SADC, held in Windhoek, Namibia, March 9, 2001, in SADC Head of State and Government Summit 
Communiques 1980- 2006, at 123, 124, http://www.sadc.int/files/3913/5292/8384/SADC_SUMMIT 
_COMMUNIQUES_1980-2006.pdf (noting unanimous adoption of Report on the Review of the 
Operations of SADC Institutions). 
 169.  Report on the Review of the Operations of SADC Institutions (Apr. 2001), 
http://www.sadc.int/files/6113/5281/6304/REPORT_ON_THE_REVIEW_OF_OPERATIONS.pdf 
[hereinafter Report on Review of Operations].  
 170.  See SADC Treaty (as amended), supra note 159. 
 171.  Report on Review of Operations, supra note 169, at 7.  
 172.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 173.  See, e.g., SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (Mar. 1, 2001), 83–84 & 88, 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(including subsidiarity as a “principle for RSDIP implementation” in the chapter on implementation 
and coordination mechanisms). 
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the involvement of actors “outside SADC structures” indicates that the 
operation of subsidiarity as here understood is not strictly institutionally 
bounded. 
Elsewhere the notion of stakeholders is made more specific. Explanatory 
notes to the report describe subsidiarity as a principle that aims to “facilitate” 
the participation of stakeholders in the “furtherance of SADC’s Common 
Agenda” and says that such stakeholders can be “associate organizations”; 
“SADC agencies and institutions”; “political, social, cultural and economic 
institutions and agencies”; and “NGOs and civil society.”174 By giving 
subsidiarity a facilitative function in bringing in both governmental and 
nongovernmental actors at various levels of political organization, the more 
limited understanding that subsidiarity has in the European context as a 
switching device between different levels of politico–legal competence in 
multilevel governance systems is being diluted. Instead, in the SADC, 
subsidiarity appears as a principle that seeks to regulate the circumstances in 
which action in pursuit of SADC’s objectives may be delegated or assigned, 
presumably by the governments of the member states, to actors that appear 
appropriately qualified for that purpose, without ex ante criteria for determining 
the type of actor and at what level of governance the actor needs to be situated. 
The usefulness or desirability of supportive action, rather than a rebuttable 
presumption for a particular level as such, seems to be at the core of this 
understanding. The fact, for example, that the creation of the SADC 
Development Finance Resource Center (SADC–DFRC)—an institution 
supporting national development finance institutions (DFIs) through research, 
advice, and other types of assistance175—is described as having been 
“established under the Principle of Subsidiarity”176 appears to buttress this 
interpretation:177 The creation of the Center neither expressly resulted from a 
conflict between overlapping competences nor created a need to regulate the 
exercise of its competences vis-à-vis the national DFIs due to the DFRC’s lack 
of executive or legislative powers. 
Last, but not least, it is noteworthy that, in contrast to the SADC Tribunal’s 
two subregional sister institutions discussed above, the exercise of its 
jurisdiction is subject to an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement and 
thus sequential subsidiarity.178 Although it lacks “a clear competence in the area 
 
 174.  Report on Review of Operations, supra note 169, at 47–48.  
 175.  For information on the DFRC, see the institution’s website at SADC-DFRC, http://www.sadc-
dfrc.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).  
 176.  Subsidiarity, SADC-DFRC, http://www.sadc-dfrc.org/subsidiarity (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
 177.  SADC–DFRC had its origins in an initiative by national DFIs, rather than by the SADC 
Summit or Council of Ministers. See History, SADC-DFRC, http://www.sadc-dfrc.org/history (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2016). It was subsequently recognized as a formal SADC institution. See Protocol on 
Finance and Investment annex 9 art. 8, Aug. 18, 2006, http://www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol 
_on_Finance__Investment2006.pdf. 
 178.  Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 167, art. 15(2). 
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of human rights,”179 the Tribunal has, like the EACJ, claimed and construed 
jurisdiction over human rights issues on the basis of a general commitment to 
“human rights, democracy and the rule of law” in the SADC Treaty180 over 
whose interpretation and application it does possess jurisdiction.181 The 
Tribunal’s first foray into human rights prompted an immediate political 
backlash that resulted in its factual demise.182 The trigger for that reaction was 
the ruling in the Campbell case:183 the Tribunal held that the land expropriation 
and redistribution policies pursued by Zimbabwe, which were entrenched by 
constitutional amendment, constituted a form of racial discrimination because 
expropriations were targeted virtually exclusively at white farmers. In addition, 
it found that the removal of domestic courts’ jurisdiction over claims contesting 
any such actions violated the right of access to a court and to a fair hearing.184 
Zimbabwe, however, viewed the decision as an “intolerable interference in the 
country’s domestic affairs.”185 Not only did Zimbabwe not comply with the 
judgment—even its High Court refused enforcement on the ground that the 
judgment conflicted with weightier considerations of domestic public policy186—
it managed to generate support among SADC members to effectively suspend 
the Tribunal and to replace it with a new body, not yet created, that will be 
competent to hear only disputes between states.187 
The decision to redefine the SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction is an exercise of 
the allocative function of subsidiarity, making the presumption for local 
competence in both human rights matters and with respect to individual 
complaints permanent and no longer subject to rebuttal. This decision also 
shows, however, that the criteria for reallocating competences to another level 
need not necessarily be normatively appealing or benign. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the role of subsidiarity in select regional 
integration regimes in Latin America and Africa by formal reference to the 
 
 179.  Solomon Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts in Africa: Prospects 
and Challenges, 17 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 84 (2009). 
 180.  SADC Treaty (as amended), supra note 159, art. 4(c). 
 181.  Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 167, art. 14(a). 
 182.  See generally Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 129, at 23–28 (discussing the political 
repercussions of the controversial Campbell case that resulted in the tribunal’s suspension). 
 183.  See Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. & Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) case no. 2/2007, 
Nov. 28, 2008.  
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Laurie Nathan, The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 
870, 876 (2013).  
 186.  GATHII, supra note 94, at 296.  
 187.  See generally Gerhard Erasmus, The New Protocol of the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional 
Changes and Implications for SADC Community Law (Trade Law Centre Working Paper No. 
US15WP01/2015, 2015), http://www.tralac.org/images/docs/6900/us15wp012015-erasmus-new-protocol-
sadc-tribunal-20150123-fin.pdf. 
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principle in their constitutive treaties and other official documents and 
decisions. Such analysis is necessarily only a first step in assessing the spread 
and use of the principle of subsidiarity and needs to be complemented with 
additional research on formal and informal practices of giving effect to 
considerations of subsidiarity. Even without a more comprehensive picture, 
however, a few conclusions may be offered. 
First, of the hypothesized relationships concerning supply and demand of 
subsidiarity that underpin the conjectures examined here, none holds across all 
cases. As the example of the Andean Community illustrates, the establishment 
of nominally multilevel governance system with pooled sovereignty or 
delegated authority does not necessarily lead to the stipulation of a subsidiarity 
principle. Likewise, the different regimes’ courts, which should have been the 
most likely candidates for stipulations of subsidiarity, especially with respect to 
their human rights jurisdiction, have not adopted anything akin to a margin-of-
appreciation doctrine in their jurisprudence to date, and ECOWAS and the 
EAC omit even the most common subsidiarity requirement with respect to the 
admissibility of individual complaints at the international level: the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. Considerations of subsidiarity have played a role, if any, 
only to the extent that the backlashes against the African courts have sought to 
repatriate certain competences fully to the member states. The analysis in part 
supports other scholars’ arguments that expectations and conclusions on the 
basis of comparing institutional blueprints will often be misleading—here with 
respect to the need for, and utility of, a principle of subsidiarity—simply 
because replicated institutional designs are frequently not intended or expected 
to operate the same way as they did, or do, in the contexts from which they 
were borrowed.188 
Second, where the principle of subsidiarity has been expressly defined, such 
as in the institutional contexts of Latin America and Africa, its meaning 
deviates from that in use in the European context. In particular, the specific 
application to instances of nonexclusive, overlapping competences has largely 
been replaced with a more general consideration of the comparative advantages 
of various types of actors, regardless of level and even their public or private 
character, in the implementation—not the articulation—of community policies. 
Third, this deviation provides further evidence of the fact that although several 
of the organizations canvassed in this article have been inspired by, and have 
borrowed from, the EU model, such transplants rarely employ “wholesale 
copying of EU institutional arrangements.”189 Nor are these definitional 
differences examples of what Amitav Acharya has called “norm subsidiarity,” 
which he defines as a “process whereby local actors create rules with a view to 
 
 188.  See generally Babatunde Fagbayibo, Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in 
Africa: An Analytical Overview, 16 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTR. L. J. 32 (2013) (discussing the attempts 
to create supranational organizations in Africa and the challenges that these organizations have faced 
over time). 
 189.  Tobias Lenz, Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and SADC, 35 
W. EUR. POL. 155, 156 (2012). 
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preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more 
powerful central actors.”190 The alternative approaches to subsidiarity identified 
here, after all, do not relate to the relationship between the regional regimes 
and other, more powerful actors, but they instead address mainly intraregime 
matters. 
In conclusion, then, rather than being a standardized European export that 
fits and benefits all multilevel regional governance systems alike, both the 
nonuse and the redefinition of subsidiarity in the institutional settings examined 
in this article suggest that its utility and meaning are very much conditioned by 
local needs and preferences. Future research must further examine these needs 
and preferences to explain the role, or absence thereof, of the subsidiarity 
principle in regional integration arrangements outside of Europe. 
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